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//2A-11/16/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM STANLEY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11693 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM STANLEY, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of William 
Stanley to the dismissal, as deficient, of his improper 
practice charge against the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
Stanley alleges that CSEA violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it expelled him 
from membership, assertedly based upon his support of a 
competing employee organization, and conducted an 
"undemocratic" process for doing so. 
The Director dismissed the charge as deficient upon the 
ground that this Board is without jurisdiction "to entertain 
complaints about internal union discipline or other internal 
union affairs which neither affect an employee's terms and 
conditions of employment nor violate' any fundamental purpose 
Board - U-11693 -2 
or policy of the Act. 
Stanley's exceptions appear to assert that CSEA has a 
statutory duty to accept him as a member if he elects to 
join, pursuant to §202 of the Act. While §2 02 provides that 
"public employees shall have the right to form, join and 
participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining or 
participating in, any employee organization of their own 
choosing", we have not held the right to join an employee 
organization to be absolute and completely beyond the 
employee organization's control. An employee's right to join 
an employee organization must, as a matter of reason and 
logic, be limited by and subject to the employee 
organization's membership requirements.-2-/ So long as those 
membership requirements do not conflict with the purposes and 
policies of the Act, and do not affect terms and conditions 
of employment, their application is beyond our jurisdiction. 
Stanley argues that his expulsion from membership in 
CSEA has resulted in the loss of life insurance policies 
available to CSEA members, and has resulted in his exclusion 
VCSEA (Stanley). 23 PERB f4562 (1990), quoting from 
this Board's decision in CSEA (Liebler, Grzedzicki and 
Henna), 17 PERB f3072, at 3110 (1984). 
•^For example, we do not construe §202 of the Act to 
preclude an employee organization from conditioning 
membership upon payment of dues, membership in a bargaining 
unit represented by it, acting in accordance with its best 
interests or other such noninvidious criteria. 
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from the contract ratification and union officer election 
processes. We find that while these matters are consequences 
of the loss of CSEA membership, the grounds for expulsion 
from membership referenced by Stanley do not affect terms and 
conditions of employment and do not give rise to a violation 
of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. This is so because the 
establishment of rules and qualifications for membership in 
an employee organization does not, per se, constitute an 
improper interference with the right to join an employee 
organization. Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the 
Director is affirmed, and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member £ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
NASSAU LOCAL 83 0, AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, 
AFL-CIO, 
_^. Charging Party-, _——-
CASE NO. U-10629 
-and-
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE, DeANGELIS & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Nassau Local 830, AFSCME, Local 
1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to the decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) which dismissed its charge against the County of 
Nassau (County). 
CSEA charged that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
issued a work order changing its procedure for scheduling certain 
time-off requests made by unit employees. After a review of the 
hearing transcript, the ALJ granted the County's motion to 
n Board - U-10629 -2 
dismiss which was made at the end of CSEA's direct case.-3=/ The 
ALT determined that the parties' then-existing contract covered 
the subject matter of the improper practice charge such that PERB 
had no jurisdiction pursuant to §2 05.5(d) of the Act. 
Alternatively-^—the —A-LT7—on—her^own^T^motion^^determined—that—therrr: r e -
charge, was untimely upon a finding that the only witness at the 
hearing testified that the departmental order was "read to all 
unit employees, including him," on September 9, 1988, more than 
four months before the charge was filed. 
For the following reasons, we determine that the ALT' s 
decision must be reversed and the case remanded. 
-xj As to the jurisdictional issue, §205.5(d) of the Act denies 
PERB the power, inter alia, to entertain a claim of violation of 
a collective bargaining agreement unless the violation of the 
agreement otherwise constitutes an improper practice. Therefore, 
unless the agreement is a reasonably arguable source of right to 
the charging party with respect to the same subject matter as the 
improper practice charge, no contract violation may be 
established, and our jurisdiction is clear. That an agreement 
may "cover" the issue raised in an improper practice charge is 
not enough to divest PERB of jurisdiction over that charge 
pursuant to §2 05.5(d) Act. Of course, if the agreement is a 
•i/The motion was premised upon CSEA's alleged failure to prove a 
change in practice and PERB's lack of jurisdiction. 
J 
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source of right to the employer, an issue of waiver of the right 
to negotiate may be presented. However, waiver of the right to 
negotiate is a matter which necessarily lies within PERB's 
jurisdiction. A determination whether a party has waived the 
right^to negotiate—an—is sue—goes to—the—dispos-i-tion—of^the 
charge on its merits, but not to PERB * s power to reach those 
merits. 
A jurisdictional issue can be raised, however, even if the 
agreement does not address specifically the particular 
allegations of the improper practice charge if the agreement is a 
source of right to the charging party with respect to the 
subject matter of the charge.-2/ Therefore, that CSEA's contract 
does not specify a notice period for some of the types of leave 
covered by the work order in issue does not mean that no 
jurisdictional issue is presented. 
Our necessary jurisdictional determination is aided by a 
charging party's actions and the results occasioned thereby. In 
this case, CSEA grieved the County's order, alleging that it 
violated three sections of the parties* then-existing agreement. 
Although the pendency of the grievance might have supported a 
deferral of the jurisdictional issue to the parties' negotiated 
•2/see, e.g. , County of Nassau, 16 PERB 5[3043 (1983) . 
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procedure pursuant to our decision in Herkimer County BOCES, 
3/ 
the advisory grievance board established by the parties' 
agreement denied the grievance before the hearing on the improper 
practice charge. A jurisdictional deferral is accordingly moot. 
Although—the grie^^ 
entitled to some weight in our consideration of the 
jurisdictional issue, there is nothing in the award to even 
suggest that there was any provision in the contract which was a 
source of right to CSEA in relevant respect. The grievance board 
decided only that no provision of the contract had been violated. 
The award reflects the grievance board's conclusion that the 
contract authorized the County's issuance and implementation of 
the order in issue. That interpretation of the contract may be 
material to a waiver defense, but it is immaterial to a 
jurisdictional defense. Our own review of the contract 
persuades us that the contract is not a source of right to CSEA 
in any relevant respect. The charge is therefore not subject to 
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds pursuant to Act §205.5(d), 
2/20 PERB ^3050 (1987). Although the last step of the 
parties' grievance procedure is nonbinding, we do not view 
the advisory nature of the determination to be an impediment 
to a Herkimer deferral provided the deferral of a 
determination concerning our jurisdiction is otherwise 
appropriate. Herkimer is premised upon our belief that the 
parties should use their negotiated procedures in the 
resolution of contract questions. 
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but raises instead statutory issues which lie within our 
jurisdiction to determine. 
As to the timeliness of the charge, §204.7(1) of our Rules 
of Procedure (Rules) precludes the dismissal of a charge as 
-untJ.me-1rV—fjl-ed-,—whethe^on—iot4&n-by-a-p_a-Ety^^y-afe&L3^sua 
sponte, unless the untimeliness of the charge is first revealed 
at a hearing.^/ In that respect, our review of the record does 
not persuade us that the charge is in fact untimely. The one 
witness who has testified thus far testified that he had not 
received a copy of the order in issue and could not recall when 
he first learned of it. Although the witness may have admitted 
that work orders are often read at line-ups,-^/ he had no 
recollection as to whether this particular order was read to unit 
employees. Untimeliness may be suggested by the date of the 
order, which is outside the four-month filing period, but by 
•^/section 2 04.7(1) Rules provides as follows: 
A motion may be made to dismiss a charge, 
or the administrative law judge may 
dismiss a charge on the ground that the 
alleged violation occurred more than four 
months prior to the filing of the charge, 
but only if the failure of timeliness was 
first revealed during the hearing. An 
objection to the timeliness of the 
charge, if not duly raised, shall be 
deemed waived. 
•^/The testimony is also arguably subject to an 
interpretation that there are often line-ups, not that work 
orders are often read at line-ups. 
Board - U-10629 -6 
itself, the order's date does not affirmatively establish that 
CSEA's charge is untimely because it is presently unknown whether 
the order was issued as dated or whether or when it was first 
announced to CSEA's agents. As the hearing did not establish a 
fadlure—o£—timeliness, t h ^ 
that reason. Section 204.7(1) of the Rules defines and limits 
the ALT's power to dismiss a charge on his or her own motion and 
the ALT's dismissal in this case exceeded those limitations. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with our decision and order herein. 
DATED: November 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member / 
#2011/16/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
— .-.•••... —-and-- — .-.-..•.—-—-.— - CASE NO.—U-1Q5QQ 
CITY OF BUFFALO (POLICE DEPARTMENT), 
Respondent. 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY (W. JAMES SCHWAN, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
SAMUEL F. HOUSTON, ESQ., Corporation Counsel (STANLEY J. 
SLIWA, ESQ., Assistant Corporation Counsel, of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Buffalo (Police Department) (City) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (AKT) on an improper practice charge 
filed by the Buffalo Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
(PBA) which alleged that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it issued 
new departmental rules in September 1988. 
The ALJ determined that the City's unilateral 
promulgation in September 1988 of a document entitled "Rules 
and Regulations for the Government and Discipline of the 
Board - U-10500 -2 
Buffalo Police Department" (Department Rules) changed its 
existing departmental rules and that those changes in five 
respects embody terms and conditions of employment which the 
City was required to bargain with the PBA. 
The^City's—exceptions—as fiJred—contestr^the ALJ-'s 
findings regarding a change in practice and policy, her 
negotiability determinations in four respect si/ and her 
rejection of the City's argument that its contract with the 
PBA privileged the promulgation of the Department Rules. In 
the brief accompanying its exceptions, the City adds 
jurisdictional, timeliness and abandonment defenses. Each of 
these defenses was raised in the City's brief to the ALT. 
However, of the three, only a timeliness defense was pleaded 
in its answer, although the abandonment claim was pursued by 
motion at the hearing. Moreover, the PBA's brief in 
opposition to the exceptions responds to each of the stated 
grounds for exception except the alleged untimeliness of the 
charge. 
Under the foregoing particular circumstances, we will 
consider each of the City's exceptions. However, the City 
and all practitioners are reminded that §204.10 of our Rules 
of Procedure (Rules) which requires specification of 
exceptions in a written statement and the waiver which 
1/The City did not file exceptions to the ALJ's holding that 
§3.10(b) of the Department Rules was mandatorily negotiable. 
Board - U-10500 -3 
results from noncompliance. Our Rules contemplate that all 
exceptions raised by a party will be incorporated into a 
single statement of exceptions denominated as such and that 
any accompanying memorandum of law will only present argument 
-insupport^of—such— enumerated— exceptions-.-—-^-^—
 : -..-- -.-
The City's contract waiver and jurisdiction defenses are 
each grounded upon Articles XXVII and XXVIII of the parties' 
current contract. Article XXVIII is a management rights 
clause and Article XXVII subjects the contract provisions to 
"applicable controlling laws" and to the City's Common 
Council's "appropriation of funds." There being nothing in 
either clause which is a source of right to the PBA with 
respect to the subject matter of the improper practice 
charge, we have jurisdiction over the charge under §205.5(d) 
of the Act.^y The contract clauses raise an arguable waiver 
issue which is within our jurisdiction and which was 
correctly decided by the ALJ. The City's disciplinary 
rights, as retained by its management rights clause, must be 
exercised "in accordance with law." The City's unilateral 
change in terms and conditions of employment was not 
consistent with its duty to negotiate and was, therefore, not 
effected "in accordance with law". 
The City also maintains that its 1988 Department Rules 
•^ -/see our more extensive discussion of contract 
jurisdiction in County of Nassau, 23 PERB 53051, also 
decided this date. 
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recodified existing rules and regulations and did not embrace 
mandatorily negotiable subject matters. After tracing the 
history of the departmental rules, the ALJ determined that 
1988 Department Rules effected substantial changes in the old 
rules—incertain—:respects^—butT-notrrin—several— others. As—to— 
those rules which were demonstrably changed, the ALJ also 
concluded that the changes were mandatorily negotiable. 
We have examined the City's arguments in support of its 
exceptions in these respects and affirm the ALJ•s 
determination that sections 1.1(a), 3.4, 6.4 and 6.9 of the 
1988 Department Rules represented changes in existing 
departmental policies or practices and that those rule 
changes are mandatorily negotiable. The grounds for the 
imposition of discipline are mandatorily negotiable.3/ An 
employee's violation of any of the Departmental Rules exposes 
the employee to discipline. When the City changed those 
rules, it necessarily changed the bases for the imposition of 
discipline against an employee, and thereby subjected itself 
to a duty to bargain. 
The City's remaining exceptions require little 
discussion. The PBA's failure to object to the City's past 
changes in its departmental rules does not waive its right to 
^•/see, e.g. , Binghamton Civil Service Forum v. City of 
Bincrhamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 11 PERB f7508 (1978). 
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object to these or future-^/ changes. The charge was timely-
filed within four months of the promulgation of the 1988 
Department Rules. The City's abandonment defense rests on 
the PBA's initial failure to file an offer of proof as 
instructed—by—the—ALJ-.-—^Ehe PBA^s ofier^of^proofT-was filed-,....•_ 
however, in accordance with the ALJ's last instruction. We 
consider her decisions to extend the original due date for 
the offer, her acceptance of the PBA's offer of proof as 
filed and her decision to process the charge thereafter to be 
matters within an ALJ's discretion. 
We affirm the decision of the ALT that the City violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act by its promulgation of the 1988 
Department Rules and order that the City: 
1. Rescind rule sections 1.1(a), 
3.4, 3.10(b), 6.4 and 6.9 from 
the "Rules and Regulations for 
the Government and Discipline 
of the Buffalo Police 
Department" as promulgated in 
September 1988. 
2. Expunge from its files any 
documents relating to any unit 
employee's failure to comply 
with any of the rule sections 
•i/countv of Tompkins, 10 PERB H[3066 (1977) . 
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enumerated in the preceding 
paragraph. 
3. Sign and post notice in the 
form attached at all places 
normally—tts-ed—to—p©s-t—-n-o-t-i-ee-s-
of information to unit 
employees. 5/ 
DATED: November 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
/hz^uzj^F*AL> 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
WUU^ £f. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
5/we have deleted that part of the AKT's recommended order 
which requires the City to negotiate in good faith in keeping 
with our belief that such orders are unnecessary in a 
unilateral change case. See Middle Country CSD, 23 PERB 
513045 (October 22, 1990). 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify 
all employees in the unit represented by the Buffalo 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. that the City of Buffalo 
(Police Department): 
1. Will rescind rule sections 1.1(a), 3.4, 
3.10(b), 6.4 and 6.9 from the "Rules and 
Regulations for the Government and Discipline of 
the Buffalo Police Department" as promulgated in 
September 1988. 
2. Will expunge jfrom its files any 
documents relating to any unit employee's 
failure to comply with any of the rule sections 
enumerated in the preceding paragraph. 
City of Buffalo 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCHESTER FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1071, IAFF, 
Charging Party, 
-and_ _ CASE NO. U-102Q6 
CITY OF ROCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
REDMOND & PARRINELLO (JOHN R. PARRINELLO, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
LOUIS N. KASH, ESQ., Corporation Counsel (BARRY C. 
WATKINS, ESQ., and CHAD R. HAYDEN, ESQ.), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Rochester Fire Fighters Association, Local 1071, 
IAFF (Union) excepts to the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
dismissal of its charge against the City of Rochester (City) 
in which the Union alleges that the City violated §209-a.l(c) 
of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
bypassed Lieutenant Richard P. Mattice for promotion to 
Captain because he exercised protected rights in his capacity 
as Union Secretary. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge on a finding, which rests 
substantially upon judgments as to witness credibility, that 
the Union had not established that Mattice's protected 
activities were the substantial motivating factor for his 
being denied a promotion and, therefore, that it had not met 
n Board - U-10206 
the necessary standard of "but for" causation. 
The Union lists 11 numbered exceptions in a 45-page 
submission which excepts to the ALJ's entire decision. The 
Union's principal argument is that there was persuasive 
circumstajitiaJ^-evXdence o±^th^e_CityJ^sijmproper motivation and 
that the City's claim to have denied Mattice the promotion 
based upon an assessment of qualifications was pretextual. 
More specifically, the Union's exceptions are directed to the 
ALJ's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of 
improper motivation, her credibility resolutions, two 
evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of opinion 
testimony and an alleged misplaced reference to our earlier 
decision in City of Rochester^/ regarding the use of union 
release time. 
The ALJ's 31-page decision issued after 7 days of 
hearing which produced a record in excess of 1,000 pages, 
involved several witnesses and exhibits and voluminous briefs 
with reply. Having reviewed the ALJ's decision, searched the 
record on which it is based, and analyzed the Union's 
exceptions, we find no reason to disturb the ALJ's findings 
of fact or the inferences she either drew or rejected. 
Whether these inferences stemmed from the sequence and timing 
of events, inconsistencies in testimony, the City's 
appointment practice, Fire Chief Heuther's relationship with 
i/l9 PERB 53081 (1986). 
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Mattice or his alleged animus, we find no reason why the 
ALJ's decision should not be sustained. Regarding the 
credibility resolutions in particular, we have stated that an 
ALJ's credibility resolutions are entitled to substantial 
deference—and "the—greatest weight. "•2-/ Although on rare 
occasion we have reversed an ALJ's credibility resolution, we 
have done so only when the objective evidence in the record 
compelled the conclusion that the ALJ's determination was 
manifestly incorrect, 
3/ 
a conclusion which we cannot reach on 
this record. 
The ALJ's evidentiary rulings excluded a unit employee's 
opinion regarding Mattice's leadership, aggressiveness and 
ability to handle the Captain's job and his opinion as to why 
Mattice was not appointed to that position. The ALJ's ruling 
on the exclusion of the employee's opinion was plainly 
correct. An articulation of opinion in this regard would 
have constituted nothing more than the witness' expression of 
his belief as to how the case should be decided, a statement 
without value to anyone deciding the case. Without 
suggesting that the ALJ erred in the first noted evidentiary 
^/captain's Endowment Ass'n, 10 PERB 53034, at 3065 
(1977). See also Hempstead Housing Auth., 12 PERB 53054 (1979). 
^/citv of Long Beach, 13 PERB f3008 (1980), conf'd. City 
of Long Beach v. PERB. 82 A.D.2d 1016, 14 PERB 57018 (1st 
Dep't 1981); Board of Education of the CSD of the City of New 
York. 21 PERB 53056 (1988), conf'd. Board of Education of the 
CSD of the City of New York v. PERB. A.D.2d , 23 PERB 
57018 (2d Dep't, October 15, 1990). 
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ruling,-4/ any error was harmless. One employee's opinion 
regarding another's qualifications could not have affected 
the ALJ's determination regarding Heuther's motive in 
bypassing Mattice for promotion. 
The exception directed to the ALJ's citation to our 
earlier City of Rochester decision is similarly dismissed. 
The reference to that case was not material to the ALT's 
disposition of the charge, whether or not misplaced. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ's decision is affirmed 
and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: November 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member r 
4/Opinion testimony by lay witnesses is generally 
inadmissible over objection in New York. E. Fisch, New York 
Evidence. §§361-75, at 235-60 (2d ed. 1977). As our hearings 
are not governed by strict rules of evidence, Rules of 
Procedure §204.7(f), we believe that the ALT could have 
received the opinion testimony in her discretion. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Ml^CIO, -—-_ — — ..':._ 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3549 
VILLAGE OF ALEXANDRIA BAY, 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 687, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3549 - 2 -
Unit: Included: All full- and part-time police officers and all 
seasonal full- and part-time police officers, 
Excluded: Chief of Police, Temporary Acting Chief of 
Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shaULjnegotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 687, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe/ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS, LOCAL UNION, NO. 529, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASEI NO. C-3704 
TOWN OF THURSTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union, No. 529 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3704 - 2 
Unit: Included: Laborers, Truck Drivers, Equipment Operators 
and Mechanics. 
Excluded: Supervisory Personnel, Clerical, Guards and all 
others excluded by the Act. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union, No. 529. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
LCUK4C^ *" G~«***i M-f 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
